Authors
Michael Rea
University of Notre Dame
Abstract
In a recent article, Trenton Mericks argues that psychological continuity analyses of personal identity over time are incompatible with endurantism. We contend that if Merricks's argument is valid, a parallel argument establishes that PC-analyses of personal identity are incompatible with perdurantism; hence, the correct conclusion to draw is simply that such analyses are all necessarily false. However, we also show that there is good reason to doubt that Merricks's argument is valid.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
Categories No categories specified
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.2307/2653409
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