Individualism, individuation and that-clauses

Erkenntnis 46 (1):49-67 (1997)
Brian Loar has argued that the well-known arguments against individualism in the philosophy of mind are insufficient because they rely on the assumption that that-clauses uniquely capture psychological content. He tried to show that this is not the use of that-clauses in philosophical psychology. I argue that he does not succeed in his argument. That-clauses sometimes capture psychological content, if our system of mental ascription is to be workable at all. I argue further that individualism tends to be at odds with a requirement of intersubjective shareability of contents and that Loar is alternative conception of psychological content is beset with difficulties
Keywords Clause  Content  Individualism  Individuation  Metaphysics  Mind  Loar, B
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DOI 10.1023/A:1005363804523
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