Literal Meaning
Cambridge University Press (2002)
| Authors | |
| Abstract |
According to the dominant position among philosophers of language today, we can legitimately ascribe determinate contents to natural language sentences, independently of what the speaker actually means. This view contrasts with that held by ordinary language philosophers fifty years ago: according to them, speech acts, not sentences, are the primary bearers of content. François Recanati argues for the relevance of this controversy to the current debate about semantics and pragmatics. Is 'what is said' determined by linguistic conventions, or is it an aspect of 'speaker's meaning'? Do we need pragmatics to fix truth-conditions? What is 'literal meaning'? To what extent is semantic composition a creative process? How pervasive is context-sensitivity? Recanati provides an original and insightful defence of 'contextualism', and offers an informed survey of the spectrum of positions held by linguists and philosophers working at the semantics/pragmatics interface.
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| Keywords | Semantics Semantics (Philosophy Pragmatics |
| Categories | (categorize this paper) |
| Reprint years | 2002, 2003, 2004, 2010 |
| Buy the book | $28.99 new (18% off) $34.99 direct from Amazon Amazon page |
| Call number | P325.R344 2004 |
| ISBN(s) | 9780511615382 9780521537360 9780511060984 |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00088.x |
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Citations of this work BETA
Conversational Implicatures (and How to Spot Them).Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (2):170-185.
Testimonial Knowledge Without Knowledge of What is Said.Andrew Peet - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):65-81.
Replies to the Papers in the Issue "Recanati on Mental Files".François Recanati - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (4):408-437.
Semantics and the Objects of Assertion.Dilip Ninan - 2010 - Linguistics and Philosophy 33 (5):355-380.
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