The Fodorian fallacy

Analysis 62 (4):285-89 (2002)
Francois Recanati
Institut Jean Nicod
In recent years Fodor has repeatedly argued that nothing epistemic can be essential to, or constitutive of, any concept. This holds in virtue of a constraint which Fodor dubs the Compositionality Constraint. I show that Fodor's argument is fallacious because it rests on an ambiguity.
Keywords Compositionality  Concept  Fallacy  Inheritance  Logic  Fodor, J
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DOI 10.1111/1467-8284.00369
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Learnability and Compositionality.Douglas Patterson - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (3):326–352.
The Notion of a Recognitional Concept and Other Confusions.Malte Dahlgrün - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (1):139 - 160.

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