The Fodorian fallacy

Analysis 62 (4):285-89 (2002)

Authors
Francois Recanati
Institut Jean Nicod
Abstract
In recent years Fodor has repeatedly argued that nothing epistemic can be essential to, or constitutive of, any concept. This holds in virtue of a constraint which Fodor dubs the Compositionality Constraint. I show that Fodor's argument is fallacious because it rests on an ambiguity.
Keywords Compositionality  Concept  Fallacy  Inheritance  Logic  Fodor, J
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1467-8284.00369
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 62 (3):609-612.
Science and Values.Harold I. Brown & Larry Laudan - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (3):439.
Language, Thought and Compositionality.Jerry Fodor - 2001 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 48:227-242.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Learnability and Compositionality.Douglas Patterson - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (3):326–352.
The Notion of a Recognitional Concept and Other Confusions.Malte Dahlgrün - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (1):139 - 160.
Coping with Informational Atomism - One of Jerry Fodor’s Legacies.Pierre Jacob - 2020 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 11 (1):19-41.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
294 ( #23,453 of 2,309,726 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
17 ( #42,638 of 2,309,726 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature