Limits of thought and Husserl's phenomenology

Dissertation, Mcgill University (2011)
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In this thesis I develop an account of the nature of limits of thought in terms of Husserl's phenomenology. I do this by exploring in terms of Husserl's phenomenology various ways thought-limits are encountered. Chapter One employs Husserl's analyses of meaning and intentionality to clarify the limits of conception and of questioning that emerge in wonder at the existence of the world. Chapter Two undertakes a critique of Husserl's refutation of psychologism in logic in order to clarify limits encountered in reflection on the possibility of knowledge and how Husserl's phenomenology proposes to overcome these limits. Chapter Three turns to Husserl's own encounter with intellectual limits in his phenomenology of time-consciousness. Here I show how some of the limits explored in the first two chapters re-emerge on a transcendental level and argue that time-consciousness marks the limit to Husserl's phenomenology in the sense that it frustrates cognitive desire. In this way the thesis shows how Husserl's phenomenology both clarifies and itself illustrates an ineliminable desire in reason to exceed its limits, even when these limits are recognized.



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Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 2002 - Northwestern University Press.
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Husserl's notion of noema.Dagfinn Follesdal - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (20):680-687.
Why Is There Anything At All?Peter van Inwagen & E. J. Lowe - 1996 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 70 (Supplementary):95-120.
Concepts of Relative Truth.Jack W. Meiland - 1977 - The Monist 60 (4):568-582.

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