Making Hegel's inferentialism explicit
In Making It Explicit, Robert Brandom has suggested an "inferentialist" alternative to the dominant "representationalist" paradigm within modern philosophy, an alternative based upon a form of pragmatism that he describes as both rationalist and linguistic.1 Representationalists typically think of awareness in terms of mental contents which somehow represent or picture worldly things, events, or states of affairs. Linguistic, rationalist pragmatists, in contrast, shift the focus from conscious experience to human linguistic practices, and specifically to the norms of rationality implicit within these practices — a shift from sentience to sapience — and approach the meanings of our linguistic claims entirely in terms of the normative inferential relations between them.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Perspectives on Pragmatism: Classical, Recent, and Contemporary.Robert Brandom - 2011 - Harvard University Press.
Inferentialism and Singular Reference.Mark McCullagh - 2005 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):183-220.
Genuine Normativity, Expressive Bootstrapping, and Normative Phenomenalism.David Lauer - 2009 - Etica and Politica / Ethics & Politics 11 (1):321-350.
Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment.Robert B. Brandom - 1994 - Harvard University Press.
Motivating Inferentialism: Comments on Making It Explicit (Ch. 2).John McDowell - 2005 - Pragmatics and Cognition 13 (1):121-140.
Persons and Practices: Kant and Hegel on Human Sapience.Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 5-6):174-198.
Pragmatism and Inferentialism.John MacFarlane - 2010 - In Bernhard Weiss & Jeremy Wanderer (eds.), Reading Brandom: On Making It Explici. Routledge. pp. 81--95.
Making It Explicit and Clear: From "Strong" to "Hyper-" Inferentialism in Brandom and Peirce.Catherine Legg - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (1):105–123.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads2 ( #772,417 of 2,171,683 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?