Omitting the second person in social understanding

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):140-141 (1996)
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Abstract

Barresi & Moore do not consider information about intentional relations available within emotional engagement with others and do not see that others are perceived in the second as well as the third person. Recognising second person information forces recognition of similarities and connections not otherwise available. A developmental framework built on the assumption of the complete separateness of self and other is inevitably flawed.

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