Philosophical Studies 142 (1):91 - 104 (2008)
The traditional argument for skepticism relies on a comparison between a normal subject and a subject in a skeptical scenario: because there is no relevant difference between them, neither has knowledge. Externalists respond by arguing that there is in fact a relevant difference—the normal subject is properly situated in her environment. I argue, however, that there is another sort of comparison available—one between a normal subject and a subject with a belief that is accidentally true—that makes possible a new argument for skepticism. Unlike the traditional form of skeptical argument, this new argument applies equally well to both internalist and externalist theories of knowledge.
|Keywords||Knowledge Skepticism Externalism Gettier problem|
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Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and Epistemic Agency.Baron Reed - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):40-69.
The Significance of Fallibilism Within Gettier's Challenge: A Case Study.Stephen Hetherington - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):539-547.
Knowledge Versus Understanding: The Cost of Avoiding Gettier.Mikael Janvid - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (2):183-197.
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