Double Effect, Means as an Intended Intentional Action Versus Side Effect as a Non-Intended Intentional Action and the Moral Relevance Involved
Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison (
1996)
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Abstract
The distinction between intended means and side-effects of what is intended is given much weight by the proponents of the principle of double effect . However, there is no consensus as to how this distinction should be interpreted and justified. In defending the PDE, my main concern is to clarify the issues central to these problems. I begin by defending basic assumptions of the PDE by exploring the logical connections among foreseen, voluntary, and intentional actions. In doing so, I also explore the logical connection between doing something intentionally and intending to do it, for the PDE has not been given its due because errors have been made stemming from the conflation of these two concepts. I argue that the former is not sufficient for the latter. This provides a criterion for distinguishing between means and side-effects. In this regard, I define the PDE as the thesis that although it is absolutely forbidden to intend the evil, it is sometimes permissible to bring about the evil intentionally. My discussion of the basic assumptions of the PDE consists in answering the question, In which cases does one do something intentionally but not intend to do it? I argue that given that P, in doing A, would thereby do B, and given that B actually happens, P does B intentionally and intends to do B if and only if what P foresaw about how P's interfering with the process would causally contribute to B comes true, P could have prevented B. In doing so, I provide reasons why Donagan's, Boyle's, and Quinn's criteria for the intended are untenable. In discussing the rationale of my interpretation, I argue that the PDE reflects the defense of the right not to be harmed by others, which in this case consists in interference with the process which causally contributes to harming. The PDE also reflects the requirement of the duty not to harm others by interfering with the process which causally contributes to harming. My discussion seeks to locate the PDE within absolutist moral theory