Fallibilism

Philosophy Compass 7 (9):585-596 (2012)
Authors
Baron Reed
Northwestern University
Abstract
Although recent epistemology has been marked by several prominent disagreements – e.g., between foundationalists and coherentists, internalists and externalists – there has been widespread agreement that some form of fallibilism must be correct. According to a rough formulation of this view, it is possible for a subject to have knowledge even in cases where the justification or grounding for the knowledge is compatible with the subject’s being mistaken. In this paper, I examine the motivation for fallibilism before providing a fully general account of the view. I conclude by looking at the two major difficulties for fallibilism: the Gettier problem and the lottery paradox.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2012.00502.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 35,865
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.

View all 72 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Why Purists Should Be Infallibilists.Michael Hannon - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-16.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

How to Think About Fallibilism.Baron Reed - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (2):143-157.
Peirce, Fallibilism, and the Science of Mathematics.Elizabeth F. Cooke - 2003 - Philosophia Mathematica 11 (2):158-175.
Fallibilism, Factivity and Epistemically Truth-Guaranteeing Justification.Boris Rähme - 2007 - In Nils Gilje & Harald Grimen (eds.), Discursive Modernity. Universitetsforlaget.
Fallibilism, Underdetermination, and Skepticism.Anthony Brueckner - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):384–391.
Fallibilism and Rational Belief.Ruth Weintraub - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (2):251-261.
Fallibilism, Contextualism and Second-Order Skepticism.Alexander S. Harper - 2010 - Philosophical Investigations 33 (4):339-359.
Knowledge and Certainty.Jason Stanley - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):35-57.
Fallibilism and the Flexibility of Epistemic Modals.Charity Anderson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):597-606.
Fallibilism.Stephen Hetherington - 2005 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-08-23

Total downloads
125 ( #49,642 of 2,293,821 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #39,924 of 2,293,821 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature