Authors
Philip Reed
Canisius College
Abstract
Hume says that sympathy is the source of our moral feeling of approval for useful qualities. But does Hume give the same psychological explanation of our approval of immediately agreeable qualities as he does to our approval of useful qualities? Does he trace our moral approbation of immediately agreeable qualities to sympathy? Some commentators, including Rachel Cohon and Don Garrett, argue that he does not. Let us call this view the ‘narrow view’ of sympathy in contrast to the ‘wide view’ of sympathy, which holds that sympathy is required for every moral sentiment. There is indeed some apparent textual evidence in Hume’s work that seems to support the narrow view. My aim in this paper is to examine that evidence and show how it is merely apparent, in particular by showing how a number of passages can be and are misread. I thus want to argue indirectly for the wide view.
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DOI 10.1080/09608788.2016.1198304
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References found in this work BETA

Sympathy and the Project of Hume's Second Enquiry.Kate Abramson - 2001 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 83 (1):45-80.
Sympathy and Benevolence in Hume's Moral Psychology.Rico Vitz - 2004 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 42 (3):261-275.
The Common Point of View in Hume’s Ethics.Rachel Cohon - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):827-850.
Hume's Artificial and Natural Virtues.Rachel Cohon - 2006 - In Saul Traiger (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Hume's Treatise. Blackwell. pp. 256--275.

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