The Alliance of Virtue and Vanity in Hume's Moral Theory

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):595-614 (2012)
Abstract
In this article I argue that vanity, the desire for and delight in the favorable opinion of others, plays a fundamental role in Hume's account of moral motivation. Hume says that vanity and virtue are inseparable, though he does not explicitly say how or why this should be. I argue that Hume's account of sympathy can explain this alliance. In resting moral sentiment on sympathy, Hume gives a fundamental role to vanity as it becomes either a mediating motive to virtue or else strengthens the otherwise weak motive of moral sentiment.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01440.x
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References found in this work BETA
Ruling Passions.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume - 1739/2000 - Oxford University Press.
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.David Hume - 2007 - In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Philosophical Review. Blackwell. pp. 338-339.
Treatise on Human Nature.David Hume - 1739 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Motivating Hume's Natural Virtues.Philip A. Reed - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (sup1):134-147.

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