Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):595-614 (2012)

Authors
Philip Reed
Canisius College
Abstract
In this article I argue that vanity, the desire for and delight in the favorable opinion of others, plays a fundamental role in Hume's account of moral motivation. Hume says that vanity and virtue are inseparable, though he does not explicitly say how or why this should be. I argue that Hume's account of sympathy can explain this alliance. In resting moral sentiment on sympathy, Hume gives a fundamental role to vanity as it becomes either a mediating motive to virtue or else strengthens the otherwise weak motive of moral sentiment.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01440.x
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References found in this work BETA

The Theory of Moral Sentiments.Adam Smith - 1759 - Dover Publications.
The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Critical Notice of Arthur Ripstein's Force and Freedom.Kyla Ebels-Duggan - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):549-573.
Motivating Hume’s Natural Virtues.Philip A. Reed - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (S1):134-147.
Hume on the Cultivation of Moral Character.Philip Reed - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (1):299-315.
Hume on Pride, Vanity and Society.Enrico Galvagni - 2020 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 18 (2):157-173.
On Pride.Lorenzo Greco - 2019 - Humana Mente 12 (35):101-123.

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