Does Cognitive Psychology Imply Pluralism About the Self?

Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):1-18 (2023)
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Abstract

Psychologists and philosophers have recently argued that our concepts of ‘person’ or ‘self’ are plural. Some have argued that we should also adopt a corresponding pluralism about the metaphysics of the self. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, I sketch and motivate an approach to personal identity that supports the inference from facts about how we think about the self to facts about the nature of the self. On the proposed view, the self-concept partly determines the nature of the self. This approach provides new justification for the recent empirical turn in the philosophy of personal identity. Second, I argue that closer examination reveals that the empirical evidence does not in fact support pluralism about the self. Instead, the evidence points toward a model of the self-concept as a complex web of attitudes that is disposed toward integration and unity. I ultimately suggest that this unifying disposition of the self-concept helps ground the existence of a singular self.

Other Versions

reprint Register, Christopher (2024) "Does Cognitive Psychology Imply Pluralism About the Self?". Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15(1):219-236

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Christopher Register
University of Oxford

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References found in this work

Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Cartesian meditations.Edmund Husserl - 1960 - [The Hague]: M. Nijhoff.
The Constitution of Selves.Marya Schechtman (ed.) - 1996 - Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Giving an Account of Oneself.Judith Butler - 2005 - New York: Fordham University Press.

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