Perspectives on Science 16 (1):1-25 (2008)

Authors
Kent Staley
Saint Louis University
William Rehg
Saint Louis University
Abstract
: For philosophers of science interested in elucidating the social character of science, an important question concerns the manner in which and degree to which the objectivity of scientific knowledge is socially constituted. We address this broad question by focusing specifically on philosophical theories of evidence. To get at the social character of evidence, we take an interdisciplinary approach informed by categories from argumentation studies. We then test these categories by exploring their applicability to a case study from high-energy physics. Our central claim is that normative philosophy of science must move beyond abstract theories of justification, confirmation, or evidence conceived impersonally and incorporate a theoretical perspective that includes dialogical elements, either as adjuncts to impersonal theories of evidence or as intrinsic to the cogency of scientific argumentation.
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DOI 10.1162/posc.2008.16.1.1
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References found in this work BETA

Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago, IL, USA: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
The Fate of Knowledge.Helen E. Longino - 2001 - Princeton University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Group Justification in Science.Kristina Rolin - 2010 - Episteme 7 (3):215-231.

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