A Short Refutation of Strict Normative Evidentialism
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (5):1-9 (2014)
Abstract
This paper shows that strict evidentialism about normative reasons for belief is inconsistent with taking truth to be the source of normative reasons for belief. It does so by showing that there are circumstances in which one can know what truth requires one to believe, yet still lack evidence for the contents of that belief.Author's Profile
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2015
DOI
10.1080/0020174x.2014.932303
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Citations of this work
Fittingness, Value and trans-World Attitudes.Andrew E. Reisner - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly (260):1-22.
Two Thesis about the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In C. McHugh, J. Way & D. Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 221-240.
Surprising Suspensions: The Epistemic Value of Being Ignorant.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Dissertation, Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Justifying the principle of indifference.Jon Williamson - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (3):559-586.
