Authors
Andrew Reisner
Uppsala University
Abstract
This paper shows that strict evidentialism about normative reasons for belief is inconsistent with taking truth to be the source of normative reasons for belief. It does so by showing that there are circumstances in which one can know what truth requires one to believe, yet still lack evidence for the contents of that belief.
Keywords evidentialism  epistemology  epistemic permissivism  normativity  belief  pragmatic reasons  theoretical reason  reason for belief  ethics of belief  permissivism
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Reprint years 2014, 2015
DOI 10.1080/0020174X.2014.932303
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References found in this work BETA

Belief's Own Ethics.J. Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.
The Domain of Reasons.John Skorupski - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
The Wrong Kind of Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.
How Truth Governs Belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
The Aim of Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Fittingness, Value and Trans-World Attitudes.Andrew E. Reisner - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly (260):1-22.
Two Thesis About the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In C. McHugh, J. Way & D. Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 221-240.
Justifying the Principle of Indifference.Jon Williamson - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (3):559-586.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

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