A Short Refutation of Strict Normative Evidentialism

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (5):1-9 (2014)
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Abstract

This paper shows that strict evidentialism about normative reasons for belief is inconsistent with taking truth to be the source of normative reasons for belief. It does so by showing that there are circumstances in which one can know what truth requires one to believe, yet still lack evidence for the contents of that belief.

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Andrew Reisner
Uppsala University

Citations of this work

Fittingness, Value and trans-World Attitudes.Andrew E. Reisner - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly (260):1-22.
P, but you don’t know that P.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14667-14690.
Two Thesis about the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In C. McHugh, J. Way & D. Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 221-240.
Surprising Suspensions: The Epistemic Value of Being Ignorant.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Dissertation, Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Justifying the principle of indifference.Jon Williamson - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (3):559-586.

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References found in this work

The Domain of Reasons.John Skorupski - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
The Wrong Kind of Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.
How truth governs belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.

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