Deep ecology and the irrelevance of morality

Environmental Ethics 18 (4):411-424 (1996)
Both Arne Naess and Warwick Fox have argued that deep ecology, in terms of “Selfrealization,” is essentially nonmoral. I argue that the attainment of the ecological Self does not render morality in the richest sense “superfluous,” as Fox suggests. To the contrary, the achievement of the ecological Self is a precondition for being a truly moral person, both from the perspective of a robust Kantian moral frameworkand from the perspective of Aristotelian virtue ethics. The opposition between selfregard and morality is a false one. The two are the same. The ecological philosophy of Naess and Fox is an environmental ethic in the grand tradition of moral philosophy
Keywords Applied Philosophy  General Interest
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ISBN(s) 0163-4275
DOI 10.5840/enviroethics19961846
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The Moral Status of Non-Human Beings and Their Ecosystems.Michel Dion - 2000 - Ethics, Place and Environment 3 (2):221 – 229.
The Moral Status of Non‐Human Beings and Their Ecosystems.Michel Dion - 2000 - Philosophy and Geography 3 (2):221-229.

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