Waco, TX: Baylor University Press (2012)

Authors
Bruce Reichenbach
Augsburg College
Abstract
The book's key questions concern whether we have a right to believe whatever we choose and whether we have significant control over our beliefs. After exploring four case studies in which the question of a right to believe arises and querying what epistemic obligations are, we consider how epistemic obligations might be grounded, whether in prudence, morality, or human virtues. Some argue that epistemic excellence is less concerned with our obligations to believe the truth and avoid falsehood than with seeing that the beliefs we hold are justified. We argue that our epistemic responsibility is best fulfilled somewhere in between the strict objectivist and strict subjectivist views. We proceed to defend the thesis that we have not only indirect but direct control over our beliefs. We then examine the nature of belief, contending for belief as both disposition and an action. In the final chapter we discuss the relation between epistemic obligations and moral accountability.
Keywords belief  epistemic  justification  obligation  truth  right to believe  Audi, Robert  accountability  voluntarism  Feldman, Richard
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ISBN(s)   1602586233
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From Epistemic to Moral Realism.Spencer Case - 2019 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (5):541-562.
How to Change People’s Beliefs? Doxastic Coercion Vs. Evidential Persuasion.Gheorghe-Ilie Farte - 2016 - Argumentum. Journal of the Seminar of Discursive Logic, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric 14 (2):47-76.

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