Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):510-534 (2015)

Authors
Indrek Reiland
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
Many people have recently argued that we need to distinguish between experiences and seemings and that this has consequences for views about how perception provides evidence. In this article I spell out my take on these issues by doing three things. First, I distinguish between mere sensations like seeing pitch black all around you and perceptual experiences like seeing a red apple. Both have sensory phenomenology in presenting us with sensory qualities like colors, being analog in Dretske's sense, and being fine-grained. However, only the latter have furthermore a perceptual phenomenology characterized by objectification and related dualities of perspectivality/completion and variation/constancy. Second, I elaborate on the reasons for thinking that both mere sensations and perceptual experiences need to be distinguished from accompanying seemings that passively assign things into conceptual categories and thereby tell you something about them. For example, when you look at a red apple and have the relevant recognitional abilities it will also normally seem to you that this is an apple. Finally, I argue that the best version of the popular dogmatist view about evidence is one which claims that it's neither experiences nor seemings by themselves, but rather the right sorts of composites of experiences and seemings that provide evidence
Keywords experience  seemings  evidence  dogmatism  dual component theory  Reid
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DOI 10.1111/papq.12113
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.
Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man.Thomas Reid - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Predication and the Frege–Geach Problem.Indrek Reiland - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):141-159.
The Epistemic Unity of Perception.Elijah Chudnoff & David Didomenico - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):535-549.

View all 23 citations / Add more citations

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