David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):671-698 (2005)
This analysis explores theories of recollective memories and their shortcomings to show how certain recollective memories are to some extent the initial experiencing of past conscious mental states. While dedicated memory theorists over the past century show remembering to be an active and subjective process, they usually make simplistic assumptions regarding the experience that is remembered. Their treatment of experience leaves unexplored the notion that the truth of memory is a dynamic interaction between experience and recollection. The argument's seven sections examine how experience, consciousness, and the self produce memories in odd but actual situations. Examples are presented that are either actual or technologically possible, and they pose a challenge for some theories of memory. Showing that an experience and a memory must be bound by psychological continuity, the sections build upon each other to challenge aprioristic beliefs about the self and consciousness. The later sections examine the lack of available accounts of memory that acknowledge consciousness, dissociation, and "selfhood" to be matters of degree, thus rendering memory theories next to useless when trying to effectively incorporate the notions of experience and reality.
|Keywords||Consciousness Continuity Experience Memory Metaphysics Unity|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Derek Parfit (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
William James (1890). The Principles of Psychology. Dover Publications.
Kathleen V. Wilkes (1988). Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments. Oxford University Press.
Ian Hacking (1995). Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory. Princeton University Press.
Stan Klein, Leda Cosmides, John Tooby & Sarah Chance (2002). Decisions and the Evolution of Memory: Multiple Systems, Multiple Functions. Psychological Review 109:306-329.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Dorothea Debus (2007). Perspectives on the Past: A Study of the Spatial Perspectival Characteristics of Recollective Memories. Mind and Language 22 (2):173-206.
Gianfranco Dalla Barba (2000). Memory, Consciousness, and Temporality: What is Retrieved and Who Exactly is Controlling the Retrieval? In Endel Tulving (ed.), Memory, Consciousness, and the Brain: The Tallinn Conference. pp. 138-155.
Kate Booth (2008). Risdon Vale: Place, Memory, and Suburban Experience. Ethics, Place and Environment 11 (3):299 – 311.
Michael G. F. Martin (2001). Out of the Past: Episodic Recall as Retained Acquaintance. In Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormack (eds.), Time and Memory. Oxford University Press. pp. 257--284.
Charles Landesman (1962). Philosophical Problems of Memory. Journal of Philosophy 59 (February):57-64.
Jackie Andrade (2001). The Contribution of Working Memory to Conscious Experience. In Working Memory in Perspective. Psychology Press. pp. 60-78.
Rocco J. Gennaro (1992). Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and Episodic Memory. Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):333-47.
Jordi Fernandez (2008). Memory and Time. Philosophical Studies 141 (3):333 - 356.
M. Schectman (1994). The Truth About Memory. Philosophical Psychology 7 (1):3-18.
Dorothea Debus (2008). Experiencing the Past: A Relational Account of Recollective Memory. Dialectica 62 (4):405-432.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads34 ( #141,423 of 1,924,989 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #212,000 of 1,924,989 )
How can I increase my downloads?