Moral Reasons for Moral Beliefs: A Puzzle for Moral Testimony Pessimism

Logos and Episteme 6 (4):429-448 (2015)
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Abstract

According to moral testimony pessimists, the testimony of moral experts does not provide non-experts with normative reasons for belief. Moral testimony optimists hold that it does. We first aim to show that moral testimony optimism is, to the extent such things may be shown, the more natural view about moral testimony. Speaking roughly, the supposed discontinuity between the norms of moral beliefs and the norms of non-moral beliefs, on careful reflection, lacks the intuitive advantage that it is sometimes supposed to have. Our second aim is to highlight the difference in the nature of the pragmatic reasons for belief that support moral testimony optimism and moral testimony pessimism, setting out more clearly the nature and magnitude of the challenge for the pessimist.

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Author Profiles

Joseph Van Weelden
Ahmedabad University
Andrew Reisner
Uppsala University

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References found in this work

A Defense of Moral Deference.David Enoch - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (5):229-258.
What is wrong with moral testimony?Robert Hopkins - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3):611-634.
Brentano and the Buck-Passers.Sven Danielsson & Jonas Olson - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):511 - 522.
The puzzle of pure moral deference.Sarah McGrath - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):321-344.

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