In Iwao Hirose & Andrew Reisner (eds.), Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Work of John Broome. Oxford University Press (2015)

Authors
Andrew Reisner
Uppsala University
Abstract
This paper considers the relation between the sources of normativity, reasons, and normative conflicts. It argues that common views about how normative reasons relate to their sources have important consequences for how we can understand putative normative conflicts.
Keywords reasons  ought  normativity  practical reason  theoretical reason  normative conflicts  dilemmas  John Broome
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Belief's Own Ethics.J. Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.
The Domain of Reasons.John Skorupski - 2010 - Oxford University Press.

View all 29 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Two Thesis About the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In C. McHugh, J. Way & D. Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 221-240.
Reasons and Normativity.Jakob Green Werkmäster - 2019 - Dissertation, Lund University

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Reason, Reasons and Normativity.Joseph Raz - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 5. Oxford University Press.
Is There Reason to Be Theoretically Rational?Andrew Reisner - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
Normative Requirements.John Broome - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):398–419.
Why Be Rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Voluntarist Reasons and the Sources of Normativity.Ruth Chang - 2009 - In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press. pp. 243-71.
Grounding Practical Normativity: Going Hybrid.Ruth Chang - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):163-187.
Two Accounts of the Normativity of Rationality.Jonathan Way - 2009 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 4 (1):1-9.
Commitment, Reasons, and the Will.Ruth Chang - 2013 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 8. Oxford University Press. pp. 74-113.
Revisionary Dispositionalism and Practical Reason.H. Lillehammer - 2000 - The Journal of Ethics 4 (3):173-190.
A Short Refutation of Strict Normative Evidentialism.Andrew E. Reisner - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (5):1-9.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-12-03

Total views
636 ( #9,877 of 2,438,931 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
37 ( #19,994 of 2,438,931 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes