Synthese:1-11 (forthcoming)

Authors
Indrek Reiland
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
Do we perceptually experience moral properties like rightness and wrongness? For example, as in Gilbert Harman’s classic case, when we see a group of young hoodlums pour gasoline on a cat and ignite it, can we, in the same robust sense, see the action’s wrongness?. Many philosophers have recently discussed this question, argued for a positive answer and/or discussed its epistemological implications. This paper presents a new case for a negative answer by, first, getting much clearer on how such experience could be possible at all; second, responding the only argument for a positive answer; and, finally, arguing that postulation of such experience is explanatorily redundant.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-018-02004-9
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Upload history
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Contents of Visual Experience.Susannah Siegel - 2010 - Oxford University Press USA.
Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.
Action in Perception. [REVIEW]Alva Noë - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (5):259-272.
Which Properties Are Represented in Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2005 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 481--503.

View all 36 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

On Experiencing Meanings.Indrek Reiland - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (4):481-492.
Moral Facts and Best Explanations.Brian Leiter - 2001 - Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2):79.
Accounting for Moral Conflicts.Thomas Schmidt - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (1):9-19.
On Experiencing High-Level Properties.Indrek Reiland - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (3):177-187.
Are Moral Properties Impossible?Wouter F. Kalf - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1869-1887.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics1: Rosalind Hursthouse.Rosalind Hursthouse - 1986 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 20:35-53.
A Deflationary Metaphysics of Morality.Fritz J. McDonald - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (3):285-298.
Motive and Rightness.Steven Sverdlik - 2011 - Oxford University Press UK.
Are Moral Philosophers Moral Experts?Bernward Gesang - 2010 - Bioethics 24 (4):153-159.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-11-09

Total views
121 ( #73,912 of 2,330,051 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
18 ( #33,596 of 2,330,051 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes