Pluralism, logical empiricism, and the problem of pseudoscience

Philosophy of Science 65 (2):333-348 (1998)
Abstract
I criticize conceptual pluralism, as endorsed recently by John Dupre and Philip Kitcher, for failing to supply strategies for demarcating science from non-science. Using creation-science as a test case, I argue that pluralism blocks arguments that keep creation-science in check and that metaphysical pluralism offers it positive, metaphysical support. Logical empiricism, however, still provides useful resources to reconfigure and manage the problem of creation-science in those practical and political contexts where pluralism will fail
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DOI 10.1086/392642
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A Pragmatic Approach to the Demarcation Problem.David B. Resnik - 2000 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 31 (2):249-267.
Cutting the Gordian Knot of Demarcation.Sven Ove Hansson - 2009 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (3):237-243.
Philosophy as Mere Rhetoric?Sven Ove Hansson - 2008 - Theoria 74 (4):267-270.

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