Propositional Attitudes and Mental Acts

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):239-245 (2012)

Authors
Indrek Reiland
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
Peter Hanks and Scott Soames have recently developed similar views of propositional attitudes on which they consist at least partly of being disposed to perform mental acts. Both think that to believe a proposition is at least partly to be disposed to perform the primitive propositional act: one the performance of which is part of the performance of any other propositional act. However, they differ over whether the primitive act is the forceless entertaining or the forceful judging. In this paper I argue that Soames’s “forceless” approach has an advantage over Hanks’s “forceful” approach which faces a serious problem.
Keywords Hanks  Soames  entertaining  judgment  predication
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DOI 10.1002/tht3.42
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References found in this work BETA

Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.John R. Searle - 1969 - Philosophical Quarterly 20 (79):172-179.
The Content–Force Distinction.Peter W. Hanks - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (2):141-164.
First-Person Propositions.Peter W. Hanks - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):155-182.

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Citations of this work BETA

Acts of Desire.Henry Ian Schiller - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-18.
New Work on Speech Acts.Eliot Michaelson & Elsa Brisinger - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):783-790.
Extended Epistemology.Robin McKenna - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):790-799.
The Redundancy of the Act.John Collins - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3519-3545.
Predication and the Frege–Geach Problem.Indrek Reiland - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):141-159.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

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