Rape as an essentially contested concept

Hypatia 16 (2):43-66 (2001)
Authors
Eric Reitan
Oklahoma State University
Abstract
: Because "rape" has such a powerful appraisive meaning, how one defines the term has normative significance. Those who define rape rigidly so as to exclude contemporary feminist understandings are therefore seeking to silence some moral perspectives "by definition." I argue that understanding rape as an essentially contested concept allows the concept sufficient flexibility to permit open moral discourse, while at the same time preserving a core meaning that can frame the discourse
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DOI 10.1353/hyp.2001.0029
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References found in this work BETA

Essentially Contested Concepts.W. B. Gallie - 1955 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1):167 - 198.
IX.—Essentially Contested Concepts.W. B. Gallie - 1956 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1):167-198.

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Unjust Sex Vs. Rape.Ann J. Cahill - 2016 - Hypatia 31 (4):746-761.
In Defence of Ubuntu.Moeketsi Letseka - 2012 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 31 (1):47-60.

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