Cambridge University Press (2011)
Philosophers have long been concerned about what we know and how we know it. Increasingly, however, a related question has gained prominence in philosophical discussion: what should we believe and why? This volume brings together twelve new essays that address different aspects of this question. The essays examine foundational questions about reasons for belief, and use new research on reasons for belief to address traditional epistemological concerns such as knowledge, justification and perceptually acquired beliefs. This book will be of interest to philosophers working on epistemology, theoretical reason, rationality, perception and ethics. It will also be of interest to cognitive scientists and psychologists who wish to gain deeper insight into normative questions about belief and knowledge.
|Keywords||Belief and doubt PHILOSOPHY / Epistemology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$40.00 used (62% off) $95.81 new (7% off) $102.78 direct from Amazon (1% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||BD215.R39 2011|
|ISBN(s)||9781107006874 1107006872 9781107540484|
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Citations of this work BETA
Does Belief Aim at the Truth?Daniel Whiting - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.
In Defence of Instrumentalism About Epistemic Normativity.Christopher Cowie - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):4003-4017.
Unifying the Requirements of Rationality.Andrew Reisner - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):243-260.
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