The Inductive Argument from Evil

American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (3):221 - 227 (1980)

Abstract

First I employ Bayes's Theorem to give some precision to the atheologian's thesis that it is improbable that God exists given the amount of evil in the world (E). Two arguments result from this: (1) E disconfirms God's existence, and (2) E tends to disconfirm God's existence. Secondly, I evaluate these inductive arguments, suggesting against (1) that the atheologian has abstracted from and hence failed to consider the total evidence, and against (2) that the atheologian's evidence adduced to support his thesis regarding the relevant probabilities is inadequate.

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,722

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-05-29

Downloads
30 (#385,862)

6 months
2 (#258,871)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Bruce Reichenbach
Augsburg College

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references

Similar books and articles