The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem

Philosophical Studies 145 (2):257 - 272 (2009)
Authors
Andrew Reisner
Uppsala University
Abstract
In this paper I argue against the stronger of the two views concerning the right and wrong kind of reasons for belief, i.e. the view that the only genuine normative reasons for belief are evidential. The project in this paper is primarily negative, but with an ultimately positive aim. That aim is to leave room for the possibility that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief. Work is required to make room for this view, because evidentialism of a strict variety remains the default view in much of the debate concerning normative reasons for belief. Strict versions of evidentialism are inconsistent with the view that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief.
Keywords Wrong kind of reasons  Reasons for belief  Evidentialism  Theoretical reason  Normativity  Reasons  Pragmatism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-008-9222-4
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 34,581
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Belief's Own Ethics.J. Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.
The Wrong Kind of Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.
A New Argument for Evidentialism.Nishi Shah - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.
Brentano and the Buck-Passers.Sven Danielsson & Jonas Olson - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):511 - 522.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No Exception for Belief.Susanna Rinard - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):121-143.

View all 31 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Evidentialism and the Numbers Game.Andrew Reisner - 2007 - Theoria 73 (4):304-316.
Weighing Pragmatic and Evidential Reasons for Belief.Andrew Reisner - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (1):17 - 27.
Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons.Jonas Olson - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):295–300.
Reasons for Action and Reasons for Belief.Christopher Tollefsen - 2006 - Social Epistemology 20 (1):55 – 65.
Leaps of Knowledge.Andrew Reisner - 2013 - In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-183.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
302 ( #13,574 of 2,268,414 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
23 ( #17,016 of 2,268,414 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature