Two Thesis about the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity

In C. McHugh, J. Way & D. Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 221-240 (2018)

Andrew Reisner
Uppsala University
In tradition linked to Aristotle and Kant, many contemporary philosophers treat practical and theoretical normativity as two genuinely distinct domains of normativity. In this paper I consider the question of what it is for normative domains to be distinct. I suggest that there are two different ways that the distinctness thesis might be understood and consider the different implications of the two different distinctness theses.
Keywords Normativity  Reasons  Practical Reason  Theoretical Reason  Normative Dilemmas  Ought
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