Two Thesis about the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity

In C. McHugh, J. Way & D. Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 221-240 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In tradition linked to Aristotle and Kant, many contemporary philosophers treat practical and theoretical normativity as two genuinely distinct domains of normativity. In this paper I consider the question of what it is for normative domains to be distinct. I suggest that there are two different ways that the distinctness thesis might be understood and consider the different implications of the two different distinctness theses.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Normative Conflicts and the Structure of Normativity.Andrew Reisner - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Andrew Reisner (eds.), Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Work of John Broome. Oxford University Press.
Normativity and the will: selected papers on moral psychology and practical reason.R. Jay Wallace (ed.) - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Normativity of Prudence.Markus Kohl - 2017 - Kant Studien 108 (4):517-542.
The normative claim of law.Stefano Bertea - 2009 - Portland, Or.: Hart.
Is there reason to be theoretically rational?Andrew Reisner - 2011 - In Andrew Evan Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
Commitment, Reasons, and the Will.Ruth Chang - 2013 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 8. Oxford University Press. pp. 74-113.
Theoretical and Practical Reason: A Critical Rationalist View.Danny Frederick - manuscript
Grounding practical normativity: going hybrid.Ruth Chang - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):163-187.
Voluntarist reasons and the sources of normativity.Ruth Chang - 2009 - In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press. pp. 243-71.
Normativity and Will: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Practical Reason.R. Jay Wallace - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press UK.
First-personal authority and the normativity of rationality.Christian Coons & David Faraci - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (4):733-740.
Rationality has its reasons, of which reason knows not: A vindication of the normativity of rationality.Bruno Guindon - unknown
Practical Reason and the Myth of the Given.Emer Mary O'hagan - 2001 - Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada)
Swimming Upstream – Problems for Smith’s Account of the Nature of Reasons.Jeppe Berggreen Høj - 2008 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 15 (3):283-294.
A dilemma for Parfit's conception of normativity.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2012 - Analysis 72 (3):466-474.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-05-01

Downloads
512 (#34,272)

6 months
62 (#67,812)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Andrew Reisner
Uppsala University

Citations of this work

Do epistemic reasons bear on the ought simpliciter?Susanne Mantel - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):214-227.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Rationality Through Reasoning.John Broome (ed.) - 2013 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Being Realistic About Reasons.Thomas Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

View all 37 references / Add more references