What Facts Should be Treated as ‘Fixed’ in Public Justification?

Social Epistemology 33 (6):491-502 (2019)
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Abstract

ABSTRACTIn his account of public reason Rawls assumes that some facts ought to be treated as ‘fixed’, or beyond reasonable disagreement. These include, for him, facts upon which there is a scientif...

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