What malapropisms mean: A reply to Donald Davidson [Book Review]

Erkenntnis 60 (3):317-334 (2004)
In this paper, I argue against Davidson's (1986) view that our ability to understand malapropisms forces us to re-think the standard construal of literal word meaning as conventional meaning. Specially, I contend that the standard construal is not only intuitive but also well-motivated, for appeal to conventional meaning is necessary to understand why speakers utter the particular words they do. I also contend that, contra Davidson, we can preserve the intuitive distinction between what a speaker means and what his words mean, even while retaining the standard construal of literal word meaning as conventional.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Ethics   Logic   Ontology
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1023/B:ERKE.0000023383.38025.cd
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 26,188
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Insincerity.Andreas Stokke - 2014 - Noûs 48 (3):496-520.
Deranging the Mental Lexicon.Endre Begby - 2015 - Inquiry 59 (1):33-55.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

88 ( #57,328 of 2,153,830 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #162,587 of 2,153,830 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums