Contemporary Pragmatism 15 (1):15-22 (2018)

Authors
Justin Remhof
Old Dominion University
Abstract
The radical skeptic argues that I have no knowledge of things I ordinarily claim to know because I have no evidence for or against the possibility of being systematically fed illusions. Recent years have seen a surge of interest in pragmatic responses to skepticism inspired by C. S. Peirce. This essay challenges one such influential response and presents a better Peircean way to refute the skeptic. The account I develop holds that although I do not know whether the skeptical hypothesis is true, I still know things I ordinarily claim to know. Although it will emerge that this reply appears similar to a classic contextualist response to radical skepticism, it avoids two central problems facing that response.
Keywords Peirce  Pragmatism  truth  justification  knowledge  skepticism
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DOI 10.1163/18758185-01501002
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge in a Social World.Alvin I. Goldman - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge in a Social World.Alvin Goldman - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):185-190.
The Fixation of Belief.C. S. Peirce - 1877 - Popular Science Monthly 12 (1):1--15.

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