Philosophia 42 (3):801-807 (2014)

Abstract
Ball (2009) claims that without phenomenal concepts, the knowledge argument fails. In this article, I argue that Ball doesn’t succeed in proving his claim. The reason is that the Marianna case is not a case where the acquisition of the concept required for entertaining a phenomenal belief content Q alone is sufficient for Marianna, given enough physical information about her environment, to infer Q
Keywords Phenomenal Concepts  The Knowledge Argument  Derek Ball
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-014-9536-8
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References found in this work BETA

Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
What Mary Didn't Know.Frank Jackson - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (5):291-295.
There Are No Phenomenal Concepts.Derek Ball - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):935-962.

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