Social Epistemology 22 (3):281-288 (2008)

Authors
René Van Woudenberg
VU University Amsterdam
Abstract
Contrastivism is the claim that the knowledge relation is ternary, it relates three relata: a subject, a proposition, and a class of contrastive propositions. The present paper is a discussion of Jonathan Schaffer's arguments in favour of contrastivism. The case is made that these are unconvincing: the traditional binary account of knowledge can handle the phenomena that ternarity is claimed to handle in a superior way
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DOI 10.1080/02691720802546138
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References found in this work BETA

Knowing the Answer.Jonathan Schaffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):383-403.
Contrastive Knowledge.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 235.

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Citations of this work BETA

Contrastive Self-Knowledge.Sarah Sawyer - 2014 - Social Epistemology 28 (2):139-152.
Epistemic Contrastivism.Peter Baumann - 2017 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Solving the Problem of Nearly Convergent Knowledge.Chris Tweedt - 2018 - Social Epistemology 32 (4):219-227.

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The Knowledge Relation: Binary or Ternary? Ren - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):281 – 288.

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