In Dirk Greimann & Geo Siegwart (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts. Routledge. pp. 5--250 (2007)
This paper further develops the non-restrictive dialectical perspective. Many philosophers hold that truthfulness is somehow constitutive of assertion. I argue against this view while simultaneously attempting to ground truthfulness in assertion’s essential features. I argue that truthfulness is the prima facie best way to avoid decisive counter-arguments against what one says. Moreover, avoiding decisive counter-arguments is a constitutive goal of rational dialectic. Thus, while truthfulness is not constitutive of assertion, it is the rational default strategy for achieving a goal that is constitutive of assertion.
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Assertion and its Constitutive Norms.Michael Rescorla - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):98-130.
Rational Responsibility and the Assertoric Character of Bald-Faced Lies.Patrick R. Leland - 2015 - Analysis 75 (4):550-554.
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