Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):474-483 (2001)
Shapiro and Taschek have argued that simply using intuitionistic logic and its Heyting semantics, one can show that there are no gaps in warranted assertability. That is, given that a discourse is faithfully modeled using Heyting's semantics for the logical constants, then if a statement _S
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References found in this work BETA
Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.
``Intuitionism, Pluralism, and Cognitive Command".Stewart Shapiro & William W. Taschek - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 20 (2):74-88.
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