Displaying and deciding substructural logics 1: Logics with contraposition

Journal of Philosophical Logic 27 (2):179-216 (1998)
Abstract
Many logics in the relevant family can be given a proof theory in the style of Belnap's display logic. However, as originally given, the proof theory is essentially more expressive than the logics they seek to model. In this paper, we consider a modified proof theory which more closely models relevant logics. In addition, we use this proof theory to show decidability for a large range of substructural logics.
Keywords Philosophy
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1017998605966
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References found in this work BETA
Gupta's Rule of Revision Theory of Truth.Nuel D. Belnap - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):103-116.
The Undecidability of Entailment and Relevant Implication.Alasdair Urquhart - 1984 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 49 (4):1059-1073.

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Citations of this work BETA
Displaying the Modal Logic of Consistency.Heinrich Wansing - 1999 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 64 (4):1573-1590.

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