Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):43 – 60 (2009)

Authors
Michael Rescorla
University of California, Los Angeles
Abstract
Dialectical egalitarianism holds that every asserted proposition requires defence when challenged by an interlocutor. This view apparently generates a vicious 'regress of justifications', since an interlocutor can challenge the premises through which a speaker defends her original assertion, and so on ad infinitum . To halt the regress, dialectical foundationalists such as Adler, Brandom, Leite, and Williams propose that some propositions require no defence in the light of mere requests for justification. I argue that the putative regress is not worrisome and that egalitarianism can handle it quite satisfactorily. I also defend a positive view that combines an anti-foundationalist conception of dialectical interaction with a foundationalist conception of epistemic justification.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00048400802215653
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 50,287
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Belief's Own Ethics.J. Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.
The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
Making It Explicit.Isaac Levi & Robert B. Brandom - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):145.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.

View all 23 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Assertion and its Constitutive Norms.Michael Rescorla - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):98-130.
Neo-Pyrrhonism.Markus Lammenranta - 2018 - In Diego E. Machuca & Baron Reed (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. London: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 565-580.
Agrippan Pyrrhonism and the Challenge of Disagreement.Diego E. Machuca - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Research 40:23-39.

View all 18 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Infinitism Redux? A Response to Klein.Carl Gillett - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):709–717.
Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning.Peter Klein - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):1 - 17.
Internalist Foundationalism and the Problem of the Epistemic Regress.José L. Zalabardo - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):34 - 58.
A Localist Solution to the Regress of Epistemic Justification.Adam Leite - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):395 – 421.
Regarding a Regress.Yuri Cath - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3):358-388.
The Trouble with Infinitism.Andrew D. Cling - 2004 - Synthese 138 (1):101 - 123.
Assertion and its Constitutive Norms.Michael Rescorla - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):98-130.
On the Regress Argument for Infinitism.John Turri - 2009 - Synthese 166 (1):157 - 163.
Shifting the Burden of Proof?Michael Rescorla - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):86-109.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
93 ( #98,071 of 2,325,680 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #170,190 of 2,325,680 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes