On the status of “things in themselves” in Kant

Synthese 47 (2):289 - 299 (1981)
For Kant, the concept of things in themselves or noumena is not a door through which we are able to exit from the phenomenal realm into the sphere of mind-independent reality. Rather, it is an epistemic, mind-imposed contrivance through which alone we are able to operate our conceptual scheme — a scheme in which objectivity and externality play a crucial role.
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DOI 10.1007/BF01064348
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Hegel's Manifold Response to Scepticism in The Phenomenology of Spirit.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (2):149-178.

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