Philosophia Mathematica 3 (2):166-174 (1995)

Authors
Michael Resnik
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Abstract
Penelope Maddy and Elliott Sober recently attacked the confirmational indispensability argument for mathematical realism. We cannot count on science to provide evidence for the truth of mathematics, they say, because either scientific testing fails to confirm mathematics (Sober) or too much mathematics occurs in false scientific theories (Maddy). I present a pragmatic indispensability argument immune to these objections, and show that this argument supports mathematical realism independently of scientific realism. Mathematical realism, it turns out, may be even more firmly established than scientific realism.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/philmat/3.2.166
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,172
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Scientific Image.William Demopoulos & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):603.
The Scientific Image.Michael Friedman - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (5):274-283.
Philosophy of Logic.Hilary Putnam - 1971 - London: Allen & Unwin.
Philosophy of Logic.Hilary Putnam - 1971 - New York, NY, USA: Routledge.
Indispensability and Practice.Penelope Maddy - 1992 - Journal of Philosophy 89 (6):275.

View all 9 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Can the Eleatic Principle Be Justified?Mark Colyvan - 1998 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):313-335.

View all 29 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
197 ( #59,995 of 2,517,841 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #206,299 of 2,517,841 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes