Scientific vs. mathematical realism: The indispensability argument

Philosophia Mathematica 3 (2):166-174 (1995)
Authors
Michael Resnik
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Abstract
Penelope Maddy and Elliott Sober recently attacked the confirmational indispensability argument for mathematical realism. We cannot count on science to provide evidence for the truth of mathematics, they say, because either scientific testing fails to confirm mathematics (Sober) or too much mathematics occurs in false scientific theories (Maddy). I present a pragmatic indispensability argument immune to these objections, and show that this argument supports mathematical realism independently of scientific realism. Mathematical realism, it turns out, may be even more firmly established than scientific realism.
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DOI 10.1093/philmat/3.2.166
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