The Causal Relevance of Content to Computation

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):173-208 (2012)
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Abstract

Many philosophers worry that the classical computational theory of mind (CTM) engenders epiphenomenalism. Building on Block’s (1990) discussion, I formulate a particularly troubling version of this worry. I then present a novel solution to CTM’s epiphenomenalist conundrum. I develop my solution within an interventionist theory of causal relevance. My solution departs substantially from orthodox versions of CTM. In particular, I reject the widespread picture of digital computation as formal syntactic manipulation.1

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Michael Rescorla
University of California, Los Angeles

Citations of this work

Perceptual Pluralism.Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2019 - Noûs 54 (4):807-838.
A Deflationary Account of Mental Representation.Frances Egan - 2020 - In Joulia Smortchkova, Krzysztof Dolega & Tobias Schlicht (eds.), Mental Representations. New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
The language of thought hypothesis.Murat Aydede - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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