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In this paper we consider the implications for belief revision of weakening the logic under which belief sets are taken to be closed. A widely held view is that the usual belief revision functions are highly classical, especially in being driven by consistency. We show that, on the contrary, the standard representation theorems still hold for paraconsistent belief revision. Then we give conditions under which consistency is preserved by revisions, and we show that this modelling allows for the gradual revision of inconsistency.
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2010-12-22
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2010-12-22
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36 ( #306,187 of 2,463,158 )
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1 ( #449,391 of 2,463,158 )
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