Philosophical Studies 158 (3):431-434 (2012)

Authors
Bradley Rettler
University of Wyoming
Abstract
In this paper, I show how a solution to Lewis’ problem of temporary intrinsics is also a response to McTaggart’s argument that the A-series is incoherent. There are three strategies Lewis considers for solving the problem of temporary intrinsics: perdurantism, presentism, and property-indexing. William Lane Craig (Analysis 58(2):122–127, 1998) has examined how the three strategies fare with respect to McTaggart’s argument. The only viable solution Lewis considers to the problem of temporary intrinsics that also succeeds against McTaggart, Craig claims, is presentism. This gives us prima facie reason to be presentists. But there is a strategy Craig does not consider-indexing, or relativizing, the copula. In this paper, I show that to the degree that indexing the copula solves the problem of temporary intrinsics, it also shows the invalidity of McTaggart’s argument. The upshot: the copula-indexer needn’t affirm the unreality of time, nor need she embrace presentism.
Keywords McTaggart  Unreality of time  Problem of temporary intrinsics  Lewis
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9679-9
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
The Unreality of Time.John Ellis McTaggart - 1908 - Mind 17 (68):457-474.
On the Plurality of Worlds.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):42-47.
On the Plurality of Worlds.Allen Stairs - 1988 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (2):333-352.

View all 13 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Temporal Parts.Katherine Hawley - 2004/2010 - Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy.
Dynamic Absolutism and Qualitative Change.Bahadır Eker - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (1):281-291.
Temporary Intrinsics and Christological Predication.Timothy Pawl - 2016 - In Jon Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, VII. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 157-189.
Presentism, Non-Presentism and the Possibility of Time Travel.David Chico & Juan Colomina - 2015 - In Antonio Manuel Liz Gutiérrez & Margarita Vázquez Campos (eds.), Temporal Points of View. Springer. pp. 265-275.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Temporary Intrinsics and Relativization.M. Oreste Fiocco - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1):64-77.
Three Arguments From Temporary Intrinsics.M. Eddon - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):605-619.
The Argument From Temporary Intrinsics.Ryan Wasserman - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):413 – 419.
Time for Presence?Jonathan Tallant - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (2):271-280.
The Reality of Now.William Seager - 1999 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13 (1):69 – 82.
A Token-Based Semantic Analysis of McTaggart's Paradox.Cheng-Chih Tsai - 2011 - Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 10:107-124.
Mc Taggart and the Truth About Time.Heather Dyke - 2002 - In Craig Callender (ed.), Time, Reality and Experience. Cambridge University Press. pp. 137-.
The Lowe Road to the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics.Lawrence B. Lombard - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 112 (2):163 - 185.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-12-13

Total views
513 ( #15,674 of 2,463,155 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #71,114 of 2,463,155 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes