Erkenntnis 75 (1):19-35 (2011)
Control of our own beliefs is allegedly required for the truth of epistemic evaluations, such as S ought to believe that p , or S ought to suspend judgment (and so refrain from any belief) whether p . However, we cannot usually believe or refrain from believing at will. I agree with a number of recent authors in thinking that this apparent conflict is to be resolved by distinguishing reasons for believing that give evidence that p from reasons that make it desirable to believe that p whether or not p is true. I argue however that there is a different problem, one that becomes clearer in light of this solution to the first problem. Someone’s approval of our beliefs is at least often a non-evidential reason to believe, and as such cannot change our beliefs. Ought judgments aim to change the world. But ‘ought to believe’ judgments can’t do that by changing the belief, if they don’t give evidence. So I argue that we should instead regard epistemic ought judgments as aimed mainly at influencing assertions that express the belief and other actions based on the belief, in accord with recent philosophical claims that we have epistemic norms for assertion and action
|Keywords||Epistemic evaluation Will to believe Assertion agnosticism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Doxastic Voluntarism, Epistemic Deontology and Belief-Contravening Commitments.Michael J. Shaffer - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1):73-82.
Rationalizing Beliefs: Evidential Vs. Pragmatic Reasons.Hamid Vahid - 2010 - Synthese 176 (3):447-462.
Leaps of Knowledge.Andrew Reisner - 2013 - In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-183.
Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations.Sinan Dogramaci - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):513-530.
Epistemic Duties and Failure to Understand One's Evidence.Scott Stapleford - 2012 - Principia 16 (1):147-177.
How to Be a Teleologist About Epistemic Reasons.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2011 - In Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen & Andrew Reisner (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press. pp. 13--33.
Epistemic Virtues and the Deliberative Frame of Mind.Adam Kovach - 2006 - Social Epistemology 20 (1):105 – 115.
Understanding, Integration, and Epistemic Value.Georgi Gardiner - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (2):163-181.
An Improper Introduction to Epistemic Utility Theory.Richard Pettigrew - 2011 - In Henk de Regt, Samir Okasha & Stephan Hartmann (eds.), Proceedings of EPSA: Amsterdam '09. Springer. pp. 287--301.
The Role of Sensory Experience in Epistemic Justification: A Problem for Coherentism. [REVIEW]Richard Schantz - 1999 - Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):177-191.
Added to index2011-03-30
Total downloads106 ( #46,643 of 2,163,687 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #188,898 of 2,163,687 )
How can I increase my downloads?