Philosophical Studies 163 (2):367-383 (2013)

Authors
Steven L. Reynolds
Arizona State University
Abstract
Adequate epistemic justification is best conceived as the appearance, over time, of knowledge to the subject. ‘Appearance’ is intended literally, not as a synonym for belief. It is argued through consideration of examples that this account gets the extension of ‘adequately justified belief’ at least roughly correct. A more theoretical reason is then offered to regard justification as the appearance of knowledge: If we have a knowledge norm for assertion, we do our best to comply with this norm when we express as assertions only beliefs that appear to us to be knowledge. If we are doing our best, there is little point in further sanctions. So a norm of knowledge for assertion would lead to a secondary norm of justified belief as the appearance of knowledge, marking a point at which our assertions may be corrected but should not be blamed
Keywords knowledge  justification  internalism/externalism  epistemology
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Reprint years 2013
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9820-4
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John P. Hawthorn - 2003 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Knowledge‐First Functionalism.Mona Simion - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):254-267.
Lotteries and Justification.Christoph Kelp - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1233-1244.
Epistemic Feedback Loops (Or: How Not to Get Evidence).Nick Hughes - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Some Thoughts on the JK-Rule1.Martin Smith - 2012 - Noûs 46 (4):791-802.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

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