Authors
Sebastián Reyes Molina
Uppsala University
Abstract
The main claim of this paper is the following: In a typical rational legal system, legal adjudication is necessarily discretional. Discretion is the result of what I call ‘systemic indeterminacy’. Systemic indeterminacy is the thesis that claims that typical rational legal systems that have an interpretative code with more than one interpretative directive and the non-redundancy clause are necessarily indeterminate. Since typical rational legal systems do not have redundant rules a plurality of interpretative directives will necessarily yield a plurality of interpretative results. Due to the non-liquet rule judges are obligated to choose among the different interpretative results provided by the interpretative code. In other words, by building a thesis on legal indeterminacy as the consequence of having a plurality of interpretative directives that necessarily yield different results, I proceed to provide an account of discretion as a necessary feature of legal adjudication.
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References found in this work BETA

Sight and Touch.Michael Martin - 1992 - In Tim Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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Law is Necessarily Vague.Timothy Endicott - 2001 - Legal Theory 7 (1):377--83.
Legal Indeterminacy.Brian Leiter - 1995 - Legal Theory 1 (4):481-492.

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