Philosophical Studies 64 (3):273-292 (1991)
Non-propositional experiences can help justify beliefs, contrary to recent claims made by Donald Davidson and Laurence Bonjour. It is argued that a perceptual belief is justified if there are no undermining beliefs and it was arrived at in response to an experience through an adequate exercise of properly learned recognitional skills
|Keywords||Belief Cognition Epistemology Experience Perception|
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The Significance of High-Level Content.Nicholas Silins - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (1):13-33.
Experience and the Space of Reasons: The Problem of Non-Doxastic Justification.Hamid Vahid - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (3):295-313.
A Role for Abstractionism in a Direct Realist Foundationalism.Benjamin Bayer - 2011 - Synthese 180 (3):357-389.
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