Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (3):315-335 (2009)
A recent account of the meaning of 'real' leads to a view of what anti-realism should be that resembles fictionalism, while not being committed to fictionalism as such or being subject to some of the more obvious objections to that view. This account of anti-realism explains how we might 'make up' what is true in areas such as mathematics or ethics, and yet these made-up truths are resistant to alterations, even by our collective decisions. Finally it is argued that the sort of anti-realism suggested explains the appearance that the ethical domain supervenes on the naturalistic.
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Fictionalism About Fictional Characters Revisited.Stuart Brock - 2016 - Res Philosophica 2 (93):1-27.
The Phenomenological Objection to Fictionalism.Stuart Brock - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):574-592.
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