In Grazer Philosophische Studien. Amsterdam: Rodopi. pp. 61-101 (1993)

Authors
Georges Rey
University of Maryland, College Park
Abstract
Fodor and LePore's attack on conceptual role semantics relies on Quine's attack on the traditional analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions, which in turn consists of four arguments: an attack on truth by convention; an appeal to revisability; a claim of confirmation holism; and a charge of explanatory vacuity. Once the different merits of these arguments are sorted out, their proper target can be seen to be not the Traditional Distinctions, but an implicit assumption about their superficial availability that we have abundant reason to reject. Once we reject it, we can see how issues of the absorbtion of conventions, the revisability of belief, and confirmation holism are compatible with the Traditional Distinctions, and that Quine's discussion only serves to camouflage the question of whether some confirmation relations are constitutive of meaning and knowable a priori
Keywords Holism  Mental States  Fodor, J  Lepore, E  Quine
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
DOI 10.5840/gps1993464
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,046
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Concepts and Cognitive Science.Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis - 1999 - In Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (eds.), Concepts: Core Readings. MIT Press. pp. 3-81.
Misrepresenting and Malfunctioning.Karen Neander - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 79 (2):109-41.
Misrepresenting & Malfunctioning.Karen Neander - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 79 (2):109-141.
Concepts.Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2003 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 190-213.
Naturalism, Fallibilism, and the a Priori.Lisa Warenski - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):403-426.

View all 14 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
56 ( #191,937 of 2,454,490 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #179,336 of 2,454,490 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes