Grazer Philosophische Studien 46 (1):61-101 (1993)

Authors
Georges Rey
University of Maryland, College Park
Abstract
Fodor and LePore's attack on conceptual role semantics relies on Quine's attack on the traditional analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions, which in turn consists of four arguments: an attack on truth by convention; an appeal to revisability; a claim of confirmation holism; and a charge of explanatory vacuity. Once the different merits of these arguments are sorted out, their proper target can be seen to be not the Traditional Distinctions, but an implicit assumption about their superficial availability that we have abundant reason to reject. Once we reject it, we can see how issues of the absorbtion of conventions, the revisability of belief, and confirmation holism are compatible with the Traditional Distinctions, and that Quine's discussion only serves to camouflage the question of whether some confirmation relations are constitutive of meaning and knowable a priori.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy
Categories No categories specified
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Reprint years 1994
ISBN(s) 0165-9227
DOI gps1993464
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Concepts and Cognitive Science.Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis - 1999 - In Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (eds.), Concepts: Core Readings. MIT Press. pp. 3-81.
Naturalism, Fallibilism, and the a Priori.Lisa Warenski - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):403-426.
Evidential Holism.Joe Morrison - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (6):e12417.
Intuition as a Second Window.Nenad Miscevic - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (Supplement):87-112.

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